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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests the incentive value of an option is affected by other options
available during choice and by options presented in the past. These contextual effects are
hard to reconcile with classical theories and have inspired accounts where contextual influ-
ences play a crucial role. However, each account only addresses one or the other of the
empirical findings and a unifying perspective has been elusive. Here, we offer a unifying
theory of context effects on incentive value attribution and choice based on normative
Bayesian principles. This formulation assumes that incentive value corresponds to a preci-
sion-weighted prediction error, where predictions are based upon expectations about
reward. We show that this scheme explains a wide range of contextual effects, such as
those elicited by other options available during choice (or within-choice context effects).
These include both conditions in which choice requires an integration of multiple attributes
and conditions where a multi-attribute integration is not necessary. Moreover, the same
scheme explains context effects elicited by options presented in the past or between-choice
context effects. Our formulation encompasses a wide range of contextual influences (com-
prising both within- and between-choice effects) by calling on Bayesian principles, without
invoking ad-hoc assumptions. This helps clarify the contextual nature of incentive value and
choice behaviour and may offer insights into psychopathologies characterized by dysfunc-
tional decision-making, such as addiction and pathological gambling.
Author summary
Research has shown that decision-making is dramatically influenced by context. Two
types of influence have been identified, one dependent on options presented in the past
(between-choice effects) and the other dependent on options currently available (within-
choice effects). Whether these two types of effects arise from similar mechanisms remain
unclear. Here we offer a theory based on Bayesian inference which provides a unifying
explanation of both between and within-choice context effect. The core idea of the theory
is that the value of an option corresponds to a precision-weighted prediction error, where
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predictions are based upon expectations about reward. An important feature of the theory
is that it is based on minimal assumptions derived from Bayesian principles. This helps
clarify the contextual nature of incentive value and choice behaviour and may offer
insights into psychopathologies characterized by dysfunctional decision-making, such as
addiction and pathological gambling.
Introduction
Standard theories of decision-making assume that the incentive value of an option should be
independent of options presented in the past and options available during choice [1–4]. These
theories are fundamentally challenged by empirical evidence showing that expectations
(derived from past experience) about upcoming options change value attribution and choice
behaviour [5–14]. For example, in a series of recent experiments from our lab [8–10], partici-
pants made choices in blocks (i.e. contexts) associated with one of two distinct, but partially
overlapping, reward distributions. Participants’ choices were consistent with attributing a
larger incentive value to rewards (common to both contexts) in blocks associated with low
compared to high average reward. In other words, the incentive value of a reward increased
when the average was lower. In addition to the average reward of a context, evidence from a
similar task indicated that reward variance within a given context also exerts an influence
on incentive value [11]. These findings highlight contextual effects exerted by expectations
about options (induced, for example, by options available during previous choices); namely,
between-choice contextual effects.
In addition, the empirical literature has highlighted contextual influences elicited by
options available during choice; namely, within-choice context effects [6, 15–20]. Standard the-
ories of decision-making assume that the incentive value of an option should be independent
of other options available during choice [1–4]. This implies that the choice proportion between
two options, comprising a more valuable and a less valuable option, should be unaffected by
the introduction of a third [2]. However, a recent study [6] has shown that this choice propor-
tion follows a U-shape function, which diminishes as the value of a third option approaches
the value of the target options–and starts increasing thereafter (Fig 1A). This is hard to recon-
cile with standard theories and represents a form of within-choice context effect, whereby the
value of an option is affected by other options available during choice.
In this task, it is unnecessary to compare options across different attributes (single-attribute
decisions; [6]). However, other forms of within-choice context effect have been observed when
options are defined by the same set of attributes that have to be traded of against each other
(multiattribute decisions; [15–20]. For example, consider a binary choice between a high-qual-
ity and expensive car A versus a low-quality and cheap car B (Fig 1B). Imagine the values of
the attributes are such that an agent is indifferent about the two options (i.e., the higher price
of car A is exactly compensated by its quality), resulting in the same probability of choosing
options A and B. What happens if a third option is also available? Standard models (based on
the assumption that values are independent of other options) predict that the choice probabil-
ity difference will remain zero, independent of a third option. However, empirical data high-
light a so-called similarity effect [20–23], whereby preference for an option over a second
option–which is equally preferable during binary decisions–increases if a third option is avail-
able that is similar to the second option (Fig 1B). In our example, the choice probability differ-
ence between car A and car B will be positive when a third low-quality and cheap (similar to
car B) car C is also available. A form of influence called the attraction effect [15, 24–26] has also
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been found with the availability of a third option that is characterized by a low score for one
attribute and an intermediate score for the other (Fig 1B). The presence of such a third option
favours the option with a high score for the attribute for which the third option has an inter-
mediate score. In our example, the choice probability difference between car A and car B will
be positive when a third medium-quality and expensive car D is also available. Finally, empiri-
cal data are consistent with a so-called compromise effect [17, 25, 27]. This applies when the
choice set includes two options scoring high in one attribute and low in another plus a third
option characterized by intermediate scores for both attributes. While the three options are
equally preferred (i.e., are chosen an equal amount of times) if presented in pairs during binary
choices, when they are all available, a preference for the option characterized by intermediate
scores is observed (Fig 1B). For instance, although during binary choices an average-price and
average-quality car E is not preferred over car A or over car B, car E will be favoured when pre-
sented together with both car A and car B.
Several explanations have been proposed to account for contextual effects on incentive value
and choice, with most models focusing on within-choice context effects during multiattribute
decisions [16–20, 27, 28]. Other theories have been proposed to explain between-choice context
effects [29–31], and disregard within-choice effects. We are aware of a single attempt to encom-
pass both between-choice and within-choice effects, though restricted to non-multiattribute
Fig 1. A: Empirical evidence concerning contextual effects elicited by multiple options available during choice (within-choice context effects). A: Single-
attribute choice, where there is no need to integrate multiple attributes to make a decision. Here a better target option associated with reward RH and a worse
target option associated with reward RL are available together with a third option associated with reward R3. The graph plots empirical findings [6] in terms of
the ratio between the probability of choosing the better target option (P[RH|RH,RL,R3]) and the probability of choosing the worse target option (P[RL|RH,RL,
R3]) as a function of the (normalized) reward of a third options R3 (see Fig 5C in [6]). B: Multiattribute choice, where multiple attributes need to be integrated
to make a decision. Here, we consider the difference in choice probability between a high-quality and high-price car A and a low-quality and low-price car B.
Although during binary choice this difference is zero, empirical evidence has shown this difference can be non-zero when a third option is also available. A
similarity effect favours car A over car B when a low-quality and low-price car C (similar to car B) is available. An attraction effect favours car A over car B
when a medium-quality and high-price car D is available. A compromise effect consists in favouring a medium-quality and medium-price car E over both car
A and car B during choices in which all three cars are available, despite the fact these cars are equally chosen when they are available in pairs during binary
choices.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769.g001
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decisions for the latter type of effects [6]. Whether models developed to explain a certain class of
context effects generalise to other effects remains unclear–and a unifying account encompassing
all known context effects is lacking. Developing a parsimonious account would represent an
important theoretical advance, as it would explain diverse empirical phenomena with the same
underlying principles.
The goal of the present paper is to describe a unifying theory, referred to as Bayesian model
of context sensitive value (BCV) that explains between-context and within-context effects, in
single and multiattribute decisions. This theory represents a generalization of a recent model
developed to explain between-choice contextual effects [11]. The key idea is that agents build a
generative model of reward within a context and, every time a new reward or option is pre-
sented, use Bayesian inference to invert this model to form a posterior belief about the underly-
ing reward distribution. Incentive value is computed during this belief update and corresponds
to a precision-weighted reward prediction error. The advantage of this theory relies on its
grounding upon simple normative principles of Bayesian statistics. In addition, the model can
explain between-choice context effects [8–11] and makes specific predictions that have been
confirmed empirically.
In brief, BCV proposes that the incentive value of a stimulus (or option) corresponds to the
change in reward expected (in any given context) when the stimulus is presented. This makes
precise predictions about choice under ideal (Bayesian) observer assumptions (with a minimal
number of free parameters). Crucially, predictions include specific forms of context effects,
and raise a question of whether these predicted effects are consistent with empirical findings.
In this paper, we applied BCV to multi-alternative choice (considering both single and multi-
attribute decisions) and ask whether the model predicts the context-effects found empirically.
We first present a theoretical extension of BCV applicable to decisions in which multiple options
are available and can be characterized by multiple attributes. We show that predictions derived
from the model are remarkably similar to empirical findings on within-choice contextual effects,
both during non-multiattribute and multiattribute decisions. We next review BCV in relation to
between-choice context effects and describe how the model can also explain these empirical find-
ings. On this basis, we offer the model as a principled description of between and within-choice
context effects.
Results
Within-choice context effects
The idea behind BCV is to establish a link between theories of value and normative accounts
of brain functioning based on Bayesian statistics [32–37]. The Bayesian brain framework rests
on the idea that an agent builds a model of the processes generating sensory cues. The genera-
tive model comprises a set of random variables (i.e., hidden states or causes of sensory out-
comes) and their causal links (i.e., probabilistic contingencies). The variables can be separated
into hidden and observable variables, the former representing the latent causes of observations,
and the latter representing sensory evidence or cues. Sensory evidence conveyed by observable
variables is combined with prior beliefs about hidden causes to produce a posterior belief
about the causes of observations. The application of this logic has proved effective in explain-
ing several empirical phenomena in perception [32–37]. For instance, psychophysical data
indicate that human perception depends on integrating different perceptual modalities (e.g.,
visual and tactile) in a manner consistent with Bayesian principles [38], where evidence is
weighted by the precision of sensory information. Furthermore, process theories that mediate
Bayesian inference (e.g., predictive coding) have a large explanatory scope in terms of neuro-
anatomy and physiology [39].
Bayesian account of contextual effects
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Inspired by a recent framework that conceptualises planning and choice as active inference
[40–45], our core proposal is that Bayesian inference drives the attribution of incentive value
to reward, and this in turn determines choice.
In a previous work, we have developed a version of BCV applicable to conditions where
past options elicit context effects by shaping expectancies before a reward is presented ([11];
see below). However, our previous formulation did not consider conditions where multiple
options (potentially characterized by multiple attributes) are available. Here we generalize
BCV to encompass conditions in which multiple options are available and options can be char-
acterized by multiple attributes. We define a multi-attribute option un (e.g., car A or car B) as a
contract that yields reward amount Ri,n relative to each attribute i (e.g., price or quality):
un ¼ fRi;ngi¼1;...;In with Ri;n 2 R ð1Þ
An option set u is the set of options currently available:
Set u ¼ fungn¼1;...;N with unan option 8 n ð2Þ
The expected value (EV) of an option un corresponds to:
Run ¼
P
iRi;n ð3Þ
For example, the total reward for car A is equal to the reward associated with price plus the
reward associated with quality. BCV assumes that an agent builds a generative model of the
reward amounts Ri,n (Fig 2). Specifically, an agent believes that, for each attribute i, reward
amounts Ri,n across options are sampled from the same population. To distinguish among
attributes, we assume that an agent believes that an independent population of reward
amounts is associated to each attribute. For example, if two attributes characterize options,
two independent populations of reward amounts are considered by the agent (Fig 2).
Formally, for each attribute i, the average of the population of the reward amounts Ri,n is
represented by a random variable Ci, which is assumed to be sampled from a Gaussian distri-
bution with prior mean μCi and uncertainty (variance) s2Ci:
Ci  N ðmCi; s
2
CiÞ ð4Þ
The agent assumes that μCi and s2Ci are known but that Ci is not directly observable and
therefore needs to be inferred from observing the different instances of reward amounts Ri,n of
options for the attribute i. This is realized in the generative model by treating Ci as a hidden
cause of Gaussian variables Ri,n with mean Ci and uncertainty s2Ri:
Ri;n  N ðCi; s
2
RiÞ ð5Þ
On the basis of the generative model, for each attribute i, the agent can estimate
C^i ¼ N ðm^CijRi; s^2CijRiÞ, namely the posterior belief about the variable Ci (i.e., the average
reward amount relative to the attribute i; the hat symbol indicates estimates of unknown
quantities), given the observation of all reward amounts of all options available for the
attribute i, represented by the set Ri. In other words, an agent assumes that there is an aver-
age reward for each attribute which is unknown but can be estimated based on the reward
amounts.
According to Bayes’ rule, the posterior belief of Ci can be calculated by considering the asso-
ciated Ri,n sequentially in any order. We propose such sequential belief updating for BCV,
even if options (and the associated reward amounts) are presented simultaneously, and we
assume that the order of options considered is random (with potentially different orders for
Bayesian account of contextual effects
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different attributes). For example, when three options characterized by two attributes are avail-
able (represented by R1,1, R1,2 and R1,3 for attribute one, and R2,1, R2,2 and R2,3 for attribute two),
inference can involve computing, in order, P(C1|R1,1), P(C1|R1,1, R1,3) and P(C1|R1,1, R1,2 R1,3)
for attribute one, and P(C2|R2,3), P(C2|R2,1, R2,3) and P(C2|R2,1, R2,2 R2,3) for attribute two. In the
example above, an agent may consider first car A and next car B when estimating the average
reward for price, and first car B and next car A when estimating the average reward for quality.
The rationale behind sequential belief updating is that the brain is equipped with a limited
computational capacity, which precludes the instantaneous (and parallel) evidence accumula-
tion, and hence requires the processing of one option after another. A similar evidence accu-
mulation process is implicit in some theories of perceptual and value-based decision-making
(e.g., [16, 46, 47]). Below, we will show that this evidence accumulation, in the form of sequen-
tial Bayesian belief updating, endows agents with the right sort of sensitivity to context. For-
mally, if Ri,n is the reward amount considered first during belief updating, in relation to
attribute i, the posterior mean m^CijRi;n is [48]:
m^CijRi;n ¼ mCi þ
s2Ci
s2Ci þ s
2
Ri
Ri;n   mCi
  
ð6Þ
Fig 2. Example of a basic generative model underlying BCV. This is a directed acyclic graph or Bayesian
network. Circles represent random variables (shaded and white circles refer to observed and non-observed
variables respectively). An arrow denotes a conditional dependence–in which one random variable supplies the
mean of the probability distribution of its children. For each attribute i, a hidden variable Ci represents the belief
about the average reward amount across options for the attribute i. This generates the mean for Gaussian
observable variables Ri,n, corresponding to reward amounts associated with options available during choice. In
this example, three options are available and options are characterized by two attributes. Note that attributes are
independent in the generative model, as there is no arrow connecting variables associated with different attributes.
Inverting this model, given observations, furnishes posterior beliefs over the mean reward amount across options
for each attribute i. This inference is performed sequentially integrating one reward amount observation at each
inference step. When a reward observation is considered, its incentive value is conceived as (precision-weighted)
reward prediction error.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769.g002
Bayesian account of contextual effects
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The posterior uncertainty s^2CijRi;n is:
s^2CijRi;n ¼ s
2
Ci  
s2Ci
s2Ci þ s
2
Ri
s2Ci ð7Þ
The crucial proposal we advance is that the incentive value Vi(Ri,n)–attributed to a reward
amount Ri,n in relation to the attribute i and associated with option un–is central to belief
updating (see Eq 6) and corresponds to a precision-weighted prediction error [49]; namely, to
the difference between Ri,n and the prior mean μCi, multiplied by a gain term which depends
on the uncertainty of that attribute s2Ri and the prior uncertainty s
2
Ci:
Vi Ri;n
  
¼
s2Ci
s2Ci þ s
2
Ri
Ri;n   mCi
  
)
m^CijRi;n ¼ mCi þ ViðRi;nÞ
ð8Þ
Within BCV, incentive value imbues reward and associated options with behavioural rele-
vance, by favouring either approach to (for positive incentive values) or avoidance of (for nega-
tive incentive values) these reward amounts and options.
This implies two fundamental forms of contextual normalization. First, a subtractive nor-
malization is exerted when μCi is different from zero. For example, if we assign positive and
negative numbers to rewards (i.e., Ri,n> 0) and punishments (i.e., Ri,n< 0) respectively, their
corresponding incentive values will change in sign, depending on whether punishment (i.e.,
μCi< 0) or reward (i.e., μCi> 0) is expected a priori. Small rewards may appear as losses in
contexts where large rewards are expected. Second, a divisive normalization depends on con-
sidering the gain term
s2Ci
s2Ciþs
2
Ri
. This implies that the positive and negative value of profits (i.e.,
Ri,n> μCi) and losses (i.e., Ri,n< μCi) are magnified by a large gain term, when we have precise
beliefs about the average reward of the population.
Sequential Bayesian belief updating means that inference proceeds by considering one
reward amount at a time. If Ri,n is considered at step t+1 and Ri,t is a set containing all reward
amounts already seen up until step t for attribute i, then a posterior mean mCijRi;t ;Ri;n is obtained
at step t+1 equivalent to (Bishop, 2006):
m^CijRi;t ;Ri;n ¼ m^CijRi;t þ
s^2CijRi;t
s^2CijRi;t þ s
2
Ri
Ri;n   m^CijRi;t
 
ð9Þ
Implying a value for the reward amount Ri,n:
Vi Ri;n
  
¼
s^2CijRi;t
s^2CijRi;t þ s
2
Ri
Ri;n   m^CijRi;t
 
ð10Þ
For each attribute i, incentive values are accumulated in memory until inference is com-
pleted (i.e., all reward amounts have been considered). We can assume that inference proceeds
in sequence or in parallel across attributes; however, this has no impact on incentive values, as
the agent believes that attributes are associated with independent reward populations (for-
mally: P(C1,C2,. . .,CI|R) = P(C1|R1), P(C2|R2),. . .,P(CI|RI)).
When all attributes for an option un have been considered, we assume that the incentive
value of the option corresponds to the sum of the incentive values of associated reward
Bayesian account of contextual effects
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amounts:
VðunÞ ¼
P
i¼1ViðRi;nÞ ð11Þ
Inference proceeds until, for all attributes i, the posterior expectation about rewards m^CijRi is
evaluated and, at this point, a choice is realized following a softmax rule based on the incentive
values of the available options [2].
In summary, BCV is based on the following assumptions:
1. Each attribute is associated with an average reward (which is a hidden variable).
2. Average rewards for different attributes are independent.
3. For each attribute, the rewards offered (or observed rewards) are treated as samples that
depend on the average reward.
4. The observed rewards are used to invert the model and infer the average reward.
5. During inference, observed rewards are considered sequentially.
6. During inference, an incentive value is calculated for each observed reward that corre-
sponds to a precision-weighted prediction error.
7. Incentive values are summed across observed rewards and attributes, and choice follows a
softmax rule.
Below these assumptions are discussed in detail. Assumptions (i), (iii), and (iv) are implicit
in adopting a Bayesian scheme. Assumption (vii) is based on a standard approach in which
incentive values are summed and a softmax choice rule is adopted. Assumption (ii) captures
the notion of multiple attributes, in other words it enables an agent to link rewards to their
attributes. Assumption (vi) (sequential belief updating or evidence accumulation) reflects the
real world constraint that people have to evaluate available options and rewards one by one. In
other words, agents cannot magically and instantaneously assimilate all the options on offer–
they have to accumulate evidence for the underlying payoffs by evaluating each in turn. This
notion plays a central role since we will see that context effects emerge because a reward is con-
textualized by previous rewards encountered during inference. This underlies assumption (v)
that associates incentive value with a precision-weighted prediction error–a central construct
in Bayesian inference. Heuristically, this scheme implies that an option is more likely to be
selected if it increases expectations of reward, and will be avoided if it decreases expectations.
In other words, an option is more likely to be selected if it suggests the situation is better than
indicated by options considered previously during belief updating.
Note that a Bayesian perspective may suggest that incentive value corresponds to a posterior
belief–rather than a precision-weighted prediction error. As an example, this would imply that
the value of the same dish will be perceived as ‘higher’ in a ‘better’ restaurant. However, empir-
ical data are consistent with the opposite notion that (adopting the same example) the value of
the same dish is perceived as lower in a better restaurant [6–14]. This evidence motivated our
proposal that incentive value corresponds to a precision-weighted prediction error, and not to
a posterior belief.
In sum, BCV provides a principled explanation for how Bayesian inference, assigning a key
role to prior expectation and uncertainty, might underlie value computation and choice. The
key role of uncertainty is reflected in the precision-weighting of prediction errors. The hypoth-
esis we entertain here is that the mechanisms postulated by BCV may be general and explain
multiple forms of context effects. We have previously applied BCV to explain between-choice
Bayesian account of contextual effects
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context effects; namely, those elicited by options presented in the past [11]. Here, we explore
the possibility of applying the same model to within-choice effects, which arise when multiple
options are available. In what follows, we will consider single and multiattribute choices under
this Bayesian formalism.
Single attribute decisions
Here, we apply BCV to explain within-choice contextual influences during non-multiattribute
decisions. These comprise choices in which trading-off different attribute is not required, as
for instance when options are defined by a single attribute. Consider first how different prior
expectations μC (i.e., the prior expectation over the average reward of the attribute) and reward
uncertainty s2R affect the choice between two options characterized by a single attribute (Fig 3).
We can examine the predicted proportion of choosing a better option (associated with high
reward RH) compared to a worse option (associated with low reward RL), as a function of prior
expectation μC and reward uncertainty s2R. Classical theories predict a flat function because
they do not model an influence of the prior mean μC and reward uncertainty s2R [1–4]. In con-
trast, BCV predicts bell-shape functions over prior expectations, that peak at the prior mean of
μC = (RH–RL)/2 (Fig 3). In this setting, the reward uncertainty s2R determines the width of the
function (larger uncertainties produce narrower functions). Below, we analyse conditions
where more than two options are available–and within-choice context effects come into play.
Classical decision-making models predict that, during choice, the choice ratio between two
options should not be affected by the reward associated with a third option [1–4]. However, a
recent study has challenged this hypothesis, highlighting within-choice context effects [6].
Adopting a choice task in which three options were available during choice, this study showed
that the choice proportion between a more valuable and a less valuable target option dimin-
ished as a third option value increased towards the value of the target options (Fig 1A). After
this point, the choice proportion started increasing (Fig 1A).
Fig 3. A: Generative model involved during choice between two options (characterized by a single attribute), one associated with high reward (RH = 10) and
the other with low reward (RL = 6). B: Proportion of choices of the better over choices of the worse option predicted by BCV (P[RH|RH,RL]/P[RL|RH,RL], as a
function of prior expectation μC and reward uncertainty s2R (100000 trials are simulated for each condition; s2C = 1 for simulations). BCV assumes a softmax
choice rule (with inverse temperature parameter equal to one for all simulations) and an equal probability for each option of being considered during the first
inference step. This shows bell-shape functions where peaks correspond to a prior mean expectation of (RH–RL)/2 and where the reward uncertainty s2R
determines the width of the function (smaller uncertainties are connected with narrower functions).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769.g003
Bayesian account of contextual effects
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Here, we examine the implications of applying BCV in this scenario. Fig 4 illustrates the
predictions of BCV of the ratio of choices of the two target options (a better target option RH
and a worse target option RL) as a function of the reward of a third option R3 and as a function
of the agent’s prior belief about the average option reward μC and about the reward uncertainty
s2R. This figure shows that all these variables exert an influence. First, for certain values of
reward uncertainty s2R and prior mean μC, the reward of a third option R3 influences the choice
proportion between the two target options according to a U-shape function, in a way that is
consistent with empirical findings (Fig 1A). Second, the impact exerted by the reward of a
third option R3 decreases as the reward uncertainty s2R increases. In other words, within-choice
context effects emerge only with small reward uncertainty s2R. This can be explained by the fact
that a small s2R magnifies reward prediction error (RPE), enabling contextual effects to emerge.
Fig 4. A: Generative model involved during choice between two options, one associated with high reward (RH = 10) and the other with low reward (RL =
6) when a third option (associated with reward R3) is also available [6]. B: Proportion of choices of the better over choices of the worse option predicted
by BCV (P[RH|RH,RL,R3]/P[RL|RH,RL,R3]), as a function of the third option reward R3 and prior expectation μC (100000 trials are simulated for each
condition; s2C = 1 for simulations). Here, the reward uncertainty s2R was set to 0.1; C: The same simulation is reported except that the reward uncertainty
s2R was set to one. D: The same simulation is reported except that the reward uncertainty s2R was set to ten.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769.g004
Bayesian account of contextual effects
PLOS Computational Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769 October 5, 2017 10 / 28
Third, when the reward uncertainty s2R is sufficiently small, the prior mean μC comes into play.
Overall, a larger prior mean μC increases the choice proportion between the two target options
(independently of the reward of a third option R3). Furthermore, the prior mean μC exerts a
modulatory influence on the effect of the reward of a third option R3, as the effect exerted by
R3 is enhanced with a larger prior mean μC. Note that context effects exerted by R3 are obtained
with μC = 0, which can be considered a default value for this parameter.
Collectively, these simulations provide proof of principle that BCV can explain within-
choice contextual effects in single-attribute decisions that are remarkably similar to those seen
in empirical studies [6]. In what follows, we now extend the explanatory scope of BCV to mul-
tiattribute problems.
Multiattribute decisions
Empirical studies of multi-attribute decisions have highlighted three forms of effects, including
the similarity [20–23], attraction [15, 24–27], and compromise effect [17, 25, 27]. Here, we
apply BCV to multi-attribute decisions and ask whether the predictions that emerge from the
model reproduce the context effects found empirically. To this aim, we consider two options
(e.g., the two cars A and B described above) defined by two attributes (e.g., price p and quality
q). Considering the reward amounts of car A, we assign Rp,A = 1 to price (low scores indicate
high price) and Rq,A = 10 to quality. Conversely, when considering the reward amounts of car
B, we assign Rp,B = 10 to price and Rq,B = 1 to quality. We now consider the choice probability
difference between option A and option B as a function of the reward amounts Rp,K and Rq,K of
a third option K.
Empirical evidence is hard to reconcile with standard models of choice, which predict that
the choice probability difference between option A and option B should not depend on the
value of a third option K. Fig 5A summarises the empirical findings by plotting the probability
of choosing A minus the probability of choosing B as a function of the attributes of a third
option K. This graph shows conditions in which the choice probability difference is bigger or
smaller than zero, illustrating both a similarity and an attraction effect. Specifically, a similarity
effect favours option A when option K is good in price and bad in quality (top-left of the
graph), and favours option B when option K is bad in price and good in quality (bottom-right
of the graph). An attraction effect favours option A when option K is bad in price and has an
average quality (bottom-middle of the graph), and favours option B when option K has an
average price and is bad in quality (middle-left of the graph).
We can now apply BCV to model choices in this scenario by analysing the influence on the
choice probability (difference between option A and option B) of the prior mean μC (we use an
equal prior mean for both attributes price and quality; formally: μCp = μCq), the reward uncer-
tainty s2R (we use an equal reward uncertainty for both attributes price and quality; formally:
s2Rp ¼ s
2
Rq), and the reward amounts Rp,K and Rq,K, associated with price and quality respec-
tively, of option K.
Fig 5B illustrates the choice probability difference (between option A and option B) with
prior mean μC = 0 and reward uncertainty s2R ¼ 0:1. Focusing on areas of the graph where a
similarity effect can be tested (i.e., top-left and bottom-right), we see that the similarity effect is
reproduced by BCV. Moreover, focusing on areas of the graphs where an attraction effect can
be tested (i.e., bottom-middle and middle-left), we can see that this effect can also be explained
by BCV. Collectively, these simulations provide proof of principle that, for some sets of values
of the prior mean μC and of the reward uncertainty s2R, BCV explains both a similarity and an
attraction effect. Note that these effects are obtained with μC = 0, which can be considered a
default value for this parameter.
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Fig 6A and 6B examines the effects of adopting other values of the prior mean μC (fixing the
reward uncertainty s2R to 0.1) in this scenario. This figure shows that an attraction effect is
obtained when the prior mean μC is smaller (μC = −2 in our simulation), but no similarity effect
emerges. Conversely, a similarity effect is evident when the prior mean μC is larger (μC = 2 in
our simulation), but the attraction effect vanishes.
Fig 5. A: Empirical evidence (derived from integrating data from available studies as in [19]) concerning the difference in probability between
choosing option A and option B when a third option K is available (P[A|A,B,K] − P[B|A,B,K]). Here options are characterized by two attributes (price p
and quality q). For car A, we assign Rp,A = 1 to price (low scores indicate high price) and Rq,A = 10 to quality. For car B, we assign Rp,B = 10 to price
and Rq,B = 1 to quality. The graph considers the choice probability difference between option A and option B as a function of the reward amounts Rq,K
(for quality; x axis) and Rp,K (for price; y axis) of a third option K. Green areas indicate values for which no difference is expected based on empirical
evidence; orange and blue areas indicates values for which a positive and negative difference is expected, respectively. B: The same analysis is
performed with data simulated using BCV (100000 trials are simulated for each condition; μC = 0; s2R ¼ 0:1; s2C = 1 for simulations).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769.g005
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Fig 6C and 6D illustrates the choice probability difference (between option A and option B)
for different values of the reward uncertainty s2R (the prior mean μC was fixed to zero). We can
see that both similarity and attraction effects are not detectable when reward uncertainty s2R is
high. For smaller values of uncertainty, a similarity effect emerges but there is no attraction
effect. Both effects can be obtained only when the reward uncertainty s2R is sufficiently low (Fig
5B). This highlights the role of the reward uncertainty s2R in determining the degree of contex-
tual effects.
In summary, our analyses show that, when simulating multi-attribute decisions with BCV,
similarity and attraction effects emerge for appropriate values of the prior mean μC and the
reward uncertainty s2R. The first parameter regulates the balance of the two effects, as an attrac-
tion effect (but no similarity effect) is obtained when the prior mean μC is small, while a
Fig 6. Predictions of BCV about the difference in probability between choosing option A and option B when a third option K is available (P[A|A,B,
K] − P[B|A,B,K]). Here options are characterized by two attributes (price p and quality q). For car A, we assign Rp,A = 1 to price (low scores indicate high
price) and Rq,A = 10 to quality. For car B, we assign Rp,B = 10 to price and Rq,B = 1 to quality. The graph considers the choice probability difference between
option A and option B as a function of the reward amounts Rq,K (for quality; x axis) and Rp,K (for price; y axis) of a third option K (100000 trials are simulated
for each condition; s2C = 1 for simulations). Different parameter sets are shown. A: Simulation using μC = −2 and s2R ¼ 0:1. B: Simulation using μC = 2 and
s2R ¼ 0:1. C: Simulation using μC = 0 and s2R ¼ 1. D: Simulation using μC = 0 and s2R ¼ 10.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769.g006
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similarity effect (but no attraction effect) is obtained when the prior mean μC is large. Both
effects emerge for intermediate values of the prior mean μC, including a prior mean μC = 0,
which is a default value for this parameter. The reward uncertainty s2R plays a key role too,
because context effects vanish when this parameter is high. Decreasing levels of reward uncer-
tainty s2R reveal a similarity effect first and then an attraction effect. These results indicate that
the similarity and attraction effects arise naturally from BCV, without any ad-hoc assump-
tions–and under natural values of model parameters (prior mean μC reward uncertainty s2R).
A compromise effect [17, 25, 27] has been observed when the choice set includes two
options scoring high in one attribute and low in another, in addition to a third option with
intermediate scores for both attributes. Crucially, the three options are equally preferred (i.e.,
are chosen an equal amount of times) if presented in pairs during binary choices. However,
when they are available altogether, a preference for the option characterized by intermediate
scores is seen. We model this scenario by manipulating the distance between attributes for two
options A and B, namely assigning Rp,A = 5 − d and Rq,A = 5 + d for option A, and Rp,B = 5 + d
and Rq,B = 5 − d for option B, where the proximity parameter d varies (across simulations)
from zero to four. To represent the option with intermediate scores for both the two attributes,
we assign Rp,K = 5 and Rq,K = 5.
Fig 7A, 7B and 7C shows the prediction of BCV using these settings during binary choices
between option K and option A, using different parameters for the prior mean μC and the
reward uncertainty s2R. The results indicate that the choice probability difference is always zero,
irrespective of the values of the proximity parameter d or the parameters of the model (prior
mean μC and reward uncertainty s2R). Fig 7D, 7E and 7F shows the choice probability difference
between option K and option A, when option B is also available. For certain values of the
parameters (prior mean μC and reward uncertainty s2R), this difference is zero with d = 0 and
increases with the proximity parameter d. This effect disappears when reward uncertainty s2R is
too large or when the prior mean μC is too small. Overall, these results show that the compro-
mise effect emerges naturally from BCV, without any ad-hoc assumptions and under default
values of the parameters (prior mean μC and reward uncertainty s2R). Interestingly, these simula-
tions predict a correlation between the compromise effect and the proximity parameter d,
reflecting differences between the intermediate and extreme options. This phenomenon is pre-
dicted by another model of the compromise effect [19] but remains to be validated empirically.
In summary, these simulations provide proof of principle that BCV predicts within-choice
contextual effects during multiattribute decisions that are remarkably similar to those seen in
empirical studies. In other words, the similarity, attraction and compromise effects seen
empirically are all emergent properties of BCV. In the next section, we turn from within choice
effects and consider between-choice context effects.
Between-choice context effects
To characterize between-choice context-effects [11], BCV uses the same generative model as
above, characterized by a prior belief μC (here we consider only options defined by a single
attribute) over reward (with uncertainty s2C) and by an observation of reward amount R (with
uncertainty s2R). Here, the generative model is extended to include a Gaussian observation var-
iable O that reflects contextual information provided before an option is presented (Fig 8A).
This depends on the hidden cause C and is endowed with uncertainty s2O (as for the reward
amount):
O  N ðC; s2OÞ ð12Þ
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As above, we assume that an agent infers the posterior expected reward of options afforded
by a given context, based on the reward amount but also now on contextual information (i.e.,
m^CjO;R). Since the latter is provided before the option, we assume that the agent infers m^Cj0 first
and then m^CjO;R, when the option is presented. Assuming a prior mean equal to zero μC = 0,
then:
m^Cj0 ¼
s2C
s2C þ s
2
O
O ð13Þ
Fig 7. Predictions of BCV related to the compromise effect, involving option A, B and K. Here, in relation with option A, we assign Rp,A = 5 − d for price
and Rq,A = 5 + d for quality; in relation with option B, we assign Rp,B = 5 + d for price and Rq,B = 5 − d for quality. The proximity parameter d varies across
simulations from zero to four. To represent the option K with intermediate scores for both the two attributes, we assign Rp,K = 5 and Rq,K = 5 (100000 trials are
simulated for each condition; s2C = 1 for simulations). A: The difference in probability between choosing option K and option A during binary choice (P[K|A,K] −
P[A|A,K]). The reward uncertainty s2R is set to 0.1 and different values of the prior mean μC are considered. B: The same simulation is reported except that the
reward uncertainty s2R was set to one. C: The same simulation is reported except that the reward uncertainty s2R was set to ten. D: The difference in probability
between choosing option K and option A during choices in which option B is also available (P[K|A,B,K] − P[A|A,B,K]). The reward uncertainty s2R is set to 0.1
and different values of the prior mean μC are considered. E: The same simulation is reported except that the reward uncertainty s2R was set to one. F: The
same simulation is reported except that the reward uncertainty s2R was set to ten.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769.g007
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And the posterior uncertainty:
s^2CjO ¼ s
2
C  
s2C
s2C þ s
2
O
s2C ð14Þ
The mean of the posterior distribution P(C|O,R) corresponds to:
m^CjO;R ¼ m^Cj0 þ
s^2CjO
s^2CjO þ s
2
R
R   m^Cj0
 
ð15Þ
Implying the following incentive value for the option:
V Rð Þ ¼
s^2CjO
s^2CjO þ s^
2
R
R   m^Cj0
 
ð16Þ
This shows that, other things being equal, information about context (reflected in the value
of O) induces subtractive value normalization. For instance, when contextual cues O supports
a larger reward, m^Cj0 will be larger and hence the reward prediction error (i.e., R   m^Cj0) will be
smaller.
Fig 8. A: Generative model where a contextual variable C reflects a prior expectancy of zero over the reward
mean, and a noisy observation O of the context value is provided. B: Generative model where context is
organized hierarchically and comprises a high level (HC; e.g., a neighbourhood) and a low level (LC; e.g., a
restaurant), both associated with noisy observations (HO and LO respectively).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769.g008
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An extension of this generative model is illustrated in Fig 8B, where contexts are organized
hierarchically. Combining the influence of reward expectancies within a hierarchy allows the
generative model to explain the impact of context at multiple levels. For instance, the value
attributed to a certain dish may depend on the reward distribution associated with a restaurant
(a more specific context), integrated with the reward distribution associated with a city (a
more general context). In detail, a higher-level prior belief about the average reward amount of
options (e.g., at the level of the neighbourhood) is represented by a Gaussian distribution with
mean μHC equal to zero and uncertainty s2HC, from which a value HC is sampled. Contextual
information about HC is provided and represented by HO that is sampled from a Gaussian
distribution with mean HC and uncertainty s2HO. A lower-level belief about the average reward
amount of options (e.g., the restaurant) is represented by a (Gaussian) distribution with mean
HC and uncertainty s2LC, from which a value LC is sampled. Contextual information about LC
is provided and represented by LO, which is sampled from a Gaussian distribution with mean
LC and uncertainty s2LO. A reward is obtained and sampled from a Gaussian distribution with
mean LC and uncertainty s2R.
We propose that agents infer the posterior expectation m^LCjHO;LO;R P(LC|HO,LO,R) sequen-
tially by estimating m^HCjHO, m^LCjHO, m^HCjHO;LO and finally m^LCjHO;LO;R. This produces an equation
for incentive value with the following form (see Materials and Methods for derivation):
VðRÞ ¼ KðR   tLOLO   tHOHOÞ ð17Þ
Three normalization factors are implicit here. The first (τLOLO) is a subtractive normaliza-
tion factor proportional to the value LO observed at the low contextual level. The second
(τHOHO) is a subtractive normalization factor proportional to the value HO observed at the
high contextual level. The terms τ represent gain-dependent effects and describe the relative
precision of information conveyed by the low-level (τLO) and high-level (τHO) observations.
Finally, a third factor (K) implements divisive normalization and depends on a gain term
which includes reward uncertainty (see Materials and Methods for details).
In recent studies [8–11], we have investigated the nature of contextual influence on incentive
value that depends on reward expectations established before choice presentation (between-
choice effects). In these studies, we have used a simple decision-making task, where participants
had to repeatedly choose between a sure monetary reward and a fifty-fifty gamble. These options
comprised double the sure monetary reward and a zero outcome, ensuring that the two options
had equivalent expected reward or value (EV). Across blocks, we manipulated the distribution of
EVs, such that these distributions overlapped. We analysed choice behaviour with EVs common
to both contexts to examine whether incentive value attributed to the objective EV changed
according to BCV predictions.
In one experiment (Fig 9A and 9B; [8, 9]), in different blocks, the sure monetary gain was
drawn from one of two distinct, but partially overlapping, distributions of rewards (low-aver-
age and high-average context). Choice behaviour was consistent with attributing a larger
incentive value to common EVs in the low average compared to high-average context. This
and similar evidence [5–14, 50] suggests that incentive values are, to some extent, rescaled to
the average reward expected in a given context, such that they increase (resp. decrease) with
smaller (resp. larger) average reward expectations.
These data fit within predictions of BCV. In addition, BCV postulates a between-choice
influence of expected reward variance on incentive values (Fig 9C and 9D). In a recent study
[11], we used the same gambling task described above and manipulated contextual variance on
two levels; one associated with blocks where two target trial EVs were presented (low-variance
context), and another with blocks where the same two target trial EVs plus a larger and a
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smaller EV were presented (high-variance context). Crucially, this ensured that the two con-
texts had equivalent average reward but different variance. BCV predicts that the incentive
value of the smaller target trial EV will be lower in the low-variance compared to the high-vari-
ance context, and the incentive value of the larger target trial EV will be higher in the low-vari-
ance compared to the high-variance context. In other words, BCV predicts a larger value
difference between the two target trial EV in the low compared to high-variance context. This
derives from the gain term, which depends on contextual reward variance. Specifically, low
variance magnifies the reward prediction error and hence further reduces the value of rewards
that are lower than expected and enhances the value of rewards that are larger than expected.
We have previously provided data that are consistent with this prediction [11].
This latter study supports the hypothesis that between-choice reward variance influences
incentive value consistent with BCV. In the same study (Fig 9E and 9F; [11]), we also reported
that between-choice context effects can be expressed at different hierarchical levels, in line
with predictions of BCV. Participants played a computer-based task, where two decks of cards
(representing a low-level context) appeared. Each card was associated with a monetary reward,
and decks contained cards with different average rewards. A card was drawn from a selected
deck and participants had to choose between half of the card reward for sure and a gamble
between the full reward and a zero outcome, each with 50% chance. Two sets of decks (repre-
senting a high-level context) alternated in a pseudo-random way. The empirical data showed
Fig 9. Between-choice effects (predicted by BCV) that depend on contexts with different averages. Contexts are associated with certain distribution
of rewards presented sequentially over trials (arranged in blocks for each context). A: Example with a single hierarchical level, where two contexts have
different average rewards. In blocks associated with a low-average context (LA; in lighter grey), possible rewards are x, x+1 and x+2; in blocks associated
with a high-average context (HA; in darker grey), possible rewards are x+1, x+2 and x+3. B: BCV prediction of the incentive value attributed to rewards
depending on these contexts. Larger values are predicted in the LA compared to the HA for amounts common to both contexts. C: Effects predicted by
BCV dependent on contexts with different variance. In blocks associated with a high-variance context (HV; in lighter grey), possible rewards are x, x+1 x+2
and x+3; in blocks associated with a low-variance context (LV; in darker grey), possible rewards are x+1 and x+2. D: BCV prediction of the incentive value
attributed to rewards depending on these contexts. Considering rewards common to both contexts, BCV predicts higher incentive value for x+1 in the high-
variance context and for x+2 in the low-variance context. E: Example with two hierarchical levels (low-level (LL) contexts, represented by filled rectangles,
and high-level (HL) contexts, represented by frames). Blocks associated with HL contexts comprise several sub-blocks associated with LL contexts having
specific average reward. In the HL context with low-value (HL-LA; light frame), a LL context with low average (LL-LA, where rewards are x, x+1 and x+2)
and a LL context with medium average (LL-MA, where rewards are x+1, x+2 and x+3) alternate. In the HL context with high-value (HL-HA; dark frame), a
LL-MA context and a LL context with high average (LL-HA, where rewards are x+2, x+3 and x+4) alternate. F: BCV prediction of the incentive value
attributed to rewards depending on these contexts. The fill colour of bars represent the LL context condition, the outline colour represent the HL context
condition. BCV predicts that incentive values derive from integrating both hierarchical levels, with larger values emerging when average reward is lower at
both context levels.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769.g009
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that the lowest incentive values were attributed when both high-value decks and deck-sets
were simultaneously presented, while the highest incentive values were attributed when low-
value decks and deck-sets were simultaneously presented. Intermediate incentive values were
attributed when decks and deck-sets had one high value and the other low value.
Collectively, these empirical studies provide evidence consistent with between-choice con-
textual effects on incentive value that depends on beliefs about the average reward and vari-
ance expected across choices at multiple hierarchical levels. Furthermore, the empirical
findings endorse the predictions derived from BCV.
Discussion
We advance BCV as a unifying theory of contextual effects in value-based choice under the
normative principles of Bayesian statistics. BCV assumes that the brain calls on Bayesian infer-
ence to invert a generative model and compute (independently for each attribute) the average
reward based on observing different reward amounts of options that are available in a given
context. Our key proposal is that incentive value emerges during this inferential process, and
corresponds to a precision-weighted reward prediction error. Here, we show that these princi-
ples are sufficient to explain a wide range of between-choice and within-choice contextual
influences; in the latter case encompassing both single and multiattribute effects. To our
knowledge, this is the first time a theory has been applied to the full range of context effects.
An important advantage of BCV is its grounding in normative principles of Bayesian statis-
tics [32–37]. Several arguments have been made in support of a Bayesian approach. These are
based on a formal and clear definition of the functions that motivate cognitive processes,
which are formulated as Bayesian inference and learning. This allows BCV to establish a direct
link with Bayesian schemes in other domains–a step towards formulating a unifying theory of
brain function. Remarkably, we show that the same basic processes postulated by BCV can be
applied to a wide range of conditions in which contextual effects on value and choice are
involved. Beyond explaining the available empirical evidence, this scheme can generate new
hypotheses (see below). Indeed one of our previous studies [11] was motivated by testing pre-
dictions arising out of our initial formulations of BCV.
BCV is associated with planning as inference and active inference [40–45]. The basic idea is
that an agent considers the rewards on offer as samples drawn from a population. The latter is
not known directly, but can be inferred based on the rewards on offer. Heuristically, agents are
interested in inferring how much reward is available on a given trial, which they estimate by
combining prior expectations with observations of available rewards. On this view, agents pri-
marily aim to infer–and not maximize–the reward; implying that utility-maximization is an
emergent process. We argue that an advantage of this perspective is that it offers a normative
interpretation of contextual effects, which emerge from the inferential treatment offered here.
Although our theoretical treatment is grounded in Bayesian inference one might argue that
the Bayesian gloss is unnecessary to understand the particular inferential mechanisms we have
called upon [51]. To a certain extent, there is tautology in Bayesian explanations for behaviour.
This follows from the complete class theorem (i.e., for every loss function and behaviour there
is a prior belief that renders the behaviour Bayes optimal) [52]. In other words, in principle,
everything is Bayes optimal under some priors. This means that the interesting questions
reduce to the form of prior beliefs that constitute a subject’s generative model. Our focus has
been on the form of these models and the particular role of precision weighting in belief updat-
ing and choice. The results of our analysis are consistent with empirical data on several forms
of context effect, and hence may contribute to a clarification of the computational principles at
play.
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In BCV incentive value, and in turn choice behaviour, emerges from Bayesian belief updat-
ing. Under continuous state space models of the hidden causes of reward values, belief updates
and incentive value can be cast as precision-weighted (reward) prediction error. A possibility
consistent with BCV is that action is steered by (precision-weighted) prediction errors and is
oriented to error cancellation, with approach and avoidance responses elicited by positive and
negative prediction errors, respectively. The crucial role of prediction error highlights a per-
spective in which incentive value is inherently relative with respect to reward expectation. Elic-
iting approach and avoidance behaviour in response to positive and negative prediction errors
can be conceived as a basic error-cancellation process (crystallized during evolution of biologi-
cal organisms), which is a core tenet of active inference schemes.
BCV postulates that the two fundamental determinants of incentive value are prediction
error and relative precision. A prediction error is determined by the difference between the
observed and expected reward which, in BCV, derives from integrating different expectations
under contextual uncertainty. Relative precision depends on the (relative) precision or prior
confidence–and ensures that the prediction error is normalised and (Bayes) optimally
weighted in relation to uncertainty about both context and reward cues. BCV predicts preci-
sion exerts an influence in two ways. First, at high hierarchical levels, precision determines the
optimal integration of multiple contextual representations–as it mandates that contexts char-
acterized by a high precision (greater reliability) will exert more influence on reward expec-
tancy. For instance, if we assume that subjects have very precise beliefs about the low-level
context (e.g., the card deck in the final experiment on between-choice context effects), then
the effect of the high-level (e.g., the deck set) will disappear. Formally, this is because in the
hierarchical model the low-level context constitutes a Markov blanket for the posterior expec-
tation about the reward option (Bishop, 2006). In other words, the effect of the high-level con-
text tells us that if subjects are using a hierarchical model, there must be posterior uncertainty
about the low-level context. Heuristically, even though they can see which deck they are cur-
rently playing with, they still nuance their expectations about this deck based upon the deck-
set from which it came. Second, at the lowest hierarchical level, precision determines the gain
assigned to the prediction error and hence is a direct determinant of incentive value.
Within BCV, the ratio between reward uncertainty and prior uncertainty determines the
gain term (or relative precision) which is used for belief updating (see Eq 6). This means that
manipulating the prior uncertainty produces exactly opposite effects compared to manipulat-
ing the reward uncertainty, meaning that varying one during simulations is sufficient for test-
ing the predictions of the model (above, we manipulated reward uncertainty and kept the
prior uncertainty constant). Thus BCV has only two parameters; namely, the prior mean and
reward uncertainty. The role of the latter is straightforward, as context effects are allowed only
with small reward uncertainty, and the size of these effects decreases with this reward uncer-
tainty. The role of the prior mean is more complex: for instance, a large prior mean permits a
similarity effect but interferes with an attraction effect, while a small prior mean allows an
attraction effect but interferes with a similarity effect. Notably, all contextual effects are
expressed when setting the prior reward expectation to zero, which can be considered the
default value. In short, relying on only two parameters endows BCV with simplicity and con-
strains the predictions that can be derived, making BCV easy to validate or falsify (see below).
Comparison with other models
We have shown that the principles underlying BCV can explain a wide range of empirical find-
ings on the context sensitivity of value-based choice. Several previous accounts have focused
on a single context effect, especially during multiattribute decisions. Some models have been
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developed explicitly for explaining the similarity effect [20, 53–55], other models for explaining
the attraction effect [56, 57], and other models for the compromise effect [27]. However, a
shortcoming of these models is their inability to explain all three effects within a single formal
framework. More recently, adopting connectionist architectures, the multi-alternative decision
field theory [16, 58, 59] and the leaky competing accumulator [19, 59, 60] have been able to
reproduce all three effects (see also [61]). The first model [16, 58] is based on a process model-
ling attentional switches across attributes and a comparator mechanism which, for the attri-
bute under attention, computes the difference between the reward of each option and the
mean reward across options. The second model [19, 59, 60] is similar, except that the compara-
tor applies a non-linear asymmetric (loss-averse) value function to the difference. Although
these models fit remarkably with empirical literature and shed light on the neural mechanisms
underlying choice, we argue that BCV presents several advantages. First, it is based on norma-
tive principles of Bayesian inference. This constrains the model in terms of empirical predic-
tions. In other words, the similarity, attraction and compromise effect are implicit in the way
the model works. In fact, these effects arise when defaults parameters are used. Second, BCV is
a more parsimonious model; as the number of free parameters is much lower (essentially, the
prior mean and the reward uncertainty). Third, without any further assumptions, BCV applies
to a wider range of phenomena including single-attribute decisions and also accounts for
between-context effects. Overall, while previous connectionist models are informative espe-
cially at the implementation level, BCV helps clarify context sensitivity at the algorithmic and
computational level.
The concept of wealth in expected utility theory [3] and status quo in prospect theory [62]
have been recently re-casted in terms of average expected reward [29]. This formulation opens
the possibility of context effects dependent on changes in reward expectation. In line with this
view, empirical evidence indicates a between-choice context effect that depends on the average
contextual reward (as for example inferred from past choices), consisting in attributing larger
incentive values in contexts characterized by lower reward. A similar idea has inspired decision
by sampling theory [14, 31], which evokes a few basic cognitive processes to explain choice
behaviour. According to this model, each choice option elicits retrieval from memory (in the
form of random sampling) of stimuli encountered in the past, especially those associated with
the current context. A set of binary comparisons follows between the option and the samples,
and the number of comparisons in which the option is favoured over each sample is recorded.
This number corresponds to the incentive value of the option and is computed for all options
available, hence determining their relative preference. Since samples are drawn from memory,
they depend on past experience and therefore reflect the distribution of options and outcomes
characterizing the environment of an agent. This model can account for an attribution of
larger incentive value to the same reward in contexts where lower compared to higher reward
is expected before options are provided. This effect is explained by a decreased likelihood,
in the former compared to the latter context, of sampling stimuli from memory that are pre-
ferred to rewards common to both contexts (assuming a recency effect in memory sampling;
[14, 31]. BCV extends these views by appealing explicitly to Bayesian principles (i.e. Bayesian
belief updating and evidence accumulation), with implications for empirical predictions. For
instance, contrary to BCV and empirical findings, it remains unclear whether these previous
models can account for between-choice contextual influence of reward variance or any within-
choice contextual effects.
Divisive normalization theory [6, 63–68] has been proposed recently to explain both
between-choice and within-choice contextual effects during single attribute decisions. Divisive
normalisation was first proposed in the sensory domain to explain phenomena such as neural
adaptation within the retina to stimuli of varying intensity [63]. There is evidence that similar
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principles can explain higher-order cognitive processes, such as selective attention and percep-
tual decision-making [63, 69]. Recently, divisive normalisation has been extended to contextual
adaptation effects in value-guided choice [6], and proposes that incentive value corresponds to
the reward divided by the average reward of past or current choices. This can explain contextual
influences elicited both within-choice effects during non-multiattribute decisions and between-
choice effects that depend on the average contextual reward. Though this scheme relies on a
normalization scheme similar to BCV, different empirical predictions arise. It remains unclear
whether this divisive normalization scheme is able to explain between-choice effects deriving
from reward variance, and can explain data on multi-attribute choices. In addition, BCV, but
not divisive normalization theory, is based on normative principles of Bayesian statistics. How-
ever, an attractive aspect of divisive normalization theory is the explicit connection with mecha-
nisms characterizing biological neural processes [63]. A similar connection can be motivated
for BCV, given several proposals showing how Bayesian inference (the framework of BCV) is
compatible with neuronal processes [49, 70, 71].
The manner in which BCV conceptualizes incentive value is similar to recent economic
models that postulate incentive value is adapted to the statistics of the expected reward distri-
bution [29, 30]. These theories can be broadly classified into those based on subtractive nor-
malization, which assume that incentive value corresponds to the reward minus a reference
value [29], and those based on divisive normalization, assuming that incentive value corre-
sponds to the reward divided (or multiplied) by the range of an expected distribution of
rewards [30]. An important difference between BCV and these theories is the derivation of the
former but not the latter from normative assumptions of Bayesian inference. From Bayesian
belief updating, BCV derives the proposition that incentive value corresponds to precision-
weighted prediction error, hence implying both a subtractive normalization to the expected
reward and a divisive normalization with respect to the reward uncertainty. Importantly, these
predictions are not ad hoc but derive from Bayesian assumptions, distinguish BCV from other
models, and have been recently supported empirically [11]. In addition, while these recent eco-
nomic models focus on between-choice context effects, BCV is more general as it can repro-
duce within-choice effects in both single and multiattribute decisions.
Like BCV, a recent proposal has interpreted multi-attribute within-choice effects based on
the notion that perception of reward is stochastic [72]. The idea is that, for each attribute, an
agent forms noisy observations of reward amounts and of the ordinal positions of the reward
amounts. Multi-attribute effects can then be obtained by integrating these two observations
[72]. Though there are analogies between BCV and the model of Howes et al. [72], we empha-
size several important differences. First, the latter does not employ a Bayesian framework,
since it is not based on integrating prior beliefs and observations, nor it is based on optimal
weighting of different sources of information (as in multi-sensory integration). Second, the
model of Howes et al. [72] has been applied to aspects of multi-attribute effects (such as the
impact on reaction times), which remain to be explored with BCV. On the other hand, the
model of Howes et al., [72] remains to be explored in relation to within-choice effects involv-
ing a single attribute and in relation to between-choice effects.
Predictions and limitations of BCV
Specific empirical predictions can be derived from BCV, and here we highlight some of these.
Standard economic theories assume that choice should be independent of whether options are
presented simultaneously or sequentially. However, the latter case remains largely to be inves-
tigated. BCV may inspire this investigation, as it predicts that a higher value will be attributed
to an option after presentation of lower value options. This because BCV proposes a sequential
Bayesian account of contextual effects
PLOS Computational Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769 October 5, 2017 22 / 28
belief updating in which options considered so far contextualize the option observed now. Other
predictions involve interactions regarding between- and within-choice effects. For example, con-
sider the example above in which an agent usually evaluates equally car A (expensive and high
quality) and car B (cheap and low quality). One may design an experiment where participants are
first exposed to a set of cars having a fixed level of quality and varying on price. BCV predicts that
this manipulation would determine a lower reward uncertainty for quality compared to price. In
other words, quality would become more salient than price, predicting a preference for car A
over car B. In addition, BCV predicts other forms of interactions regarding between- and within-
choice effects dependent on manipulations of the reward uncertainty and the prior mean (see
above), which also remain to be explored empirically. Finally, BCV may be relevant for research
on the neural underpinnings of decision-making. A main aspect of this theory is the idea that
incentive value corresponds to a precision-weighted reward prediction error. Interestingly,
reward prediction error is reflected in activity of brain regions involved in reward processing
[73]. BCV raises the possibility that a stimulus which elicits a stronger prediction error response
in the brain will be attributed a higher incentive value.
There are shortcomings to BCV, though we argue that the same framework may be fruit-
fully used to address some of these shortcomings. A shortcoming of our current formulation
assumes that model parameters are given. In reality, these parameters need to be learned in the
first place. Questions about the mechanisms that might underpin learning of generative mod-
els adopted for Bayesian inference are still largely open, though substantial contributions exist,
particularly in the context of structure learning [74–80]. A second shortcoming is that here we
have assumed that choices occur after inference has considered all observations. An important
extension of BCV is a consideration that action tendencies actually develop during evidence
accumulation, and this speaks to models of choice that focus on action dynamics, sequential
policy optimisation and reaction times [16, 46, 47]. Another important extension of BCV
would be to generalize to domains outside incentive value computation. Context effects similar
to those observed in value-based decision-making have been reported in many other condi-
tions during perception and judgement [81–84]. Notably, multi-attribute context effects have
been recently shown outside incentive value computation [85, 86], suggesting that they may
derive from a general way in which the brain works [61].
Conclusions
We offer BCV as a unifying theory of contextual effects during choice behaviour based on
Bayesian normative principles. BCV predictions are in line with available empirical evidence
about context sensitivity seen empirically both within and between-choice. These different
effects are explained using the same simple set of principles, invoking minimal assumptions.
We argue that strengths of this model are its foundation on normative principles, simplicity,
the link with other influential models of brain function, and the ability to explain a wide range
of empirical data. This theory may help clarify the nature of incentive value attribution and
choice behaviour. This is particularly prescient when trying to understand ecological phenom-
ena and psychopathologies characterized by dysfunctional choice, such as addiction.
Materials and methods
Here we derive Eq 17 from the generative model shown in Fig 9B. A higher-level contextual
variable (e.g., a neighbourhood containing several restaurants) is represented by a Gaussian
distribution with mean μHC equal to zero and uncertainty s2HC, from which a value HC is sam-
pled. Sensory evidence about HC is provided and represented by HO which is sampled from a
Gaussian distribution with mean HC and uncertainty s2HO. A lower-level contextual variable
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(e.g., one of the restaurants) is represented by a (Gaussian) distribution with mean HC and
uncertainty s2LC, from which a value LC is sampled. Sensory evidence about LC is provided
and represented by LO, which is sampled from a Gaussian distribution with mean LC and
uncertainty s2LO. A reward is obtained and sampled from a Gaussian distribution with mean
LC and uncertainty s2R. The posterior distribution P(LC|HO,LO,R) can be inferred sequen-
tially in the order P(HC|HO), P(LC|HO), P(LC|HO,LO), and P(LC|HO,LO,R). The posterior
mean of P(HC|HO) is:
m^HCjH0 ¼
s2HC
s2HC þ s
2
HO
HO ð18Þ
And the posterior uncertainty:
s^2HCjH0 ¼ s
2
HC  
s2HC
s2HC þ s
2
HO
s2HC ð19Þ
The posterior mean of P(LC|HO) is equal to m^HCjH0 (m^LCjH0 ¼ m^HCjH0), while the posterior
uncertainty is:
s^2LCjH0 ¼ s^
2
HCjH0 þ s
2
LC ð20Þ
The posterior mean of P(LC|HO,PO) is:
m^LCjHO;LO ¼ m^LCjH0 þ
s^2LCjHO
s^2LCjHO þ s
2
LO
LO   m^LCjH0
 
ð21Þ
And the posterior uncertainty:
s^2LCjH0;LO ¼ s^
2
LCjH0  
s^2LCjHO
s^2LCjHO þ s
2
LO
s^2LCjH0 ð22Þ
The posterior mean of P(LC|HO,LO,R) is:
m^LCjHO;LO;R ¼ m^LCjHO;LO þ
s^2LCjHO;LO
s^2LCjHO;LO þ s
2
R
R   m^LCjHO;LO
 
ð23Þ
Finally, with few rearrangements, we obtain the following incentive value for a reward
offer:
V Rð Þ ¼
s^2LCjHO;LO
s^2LCjHO;LO þ s
2
R
R  
s^2LCjHO
s^2LCjHO þ s
2
LO
LO  
s2LO
s^2LCjHO þ s
2
LO
s2HC
s2HC þ s
2
HO
HO
 !
ð24Þ
This equation implements three normalization factors: (i) a subtractive normalization fac-
tor
s^2LCjHO
s^2
LCjHO
þs2LO
LO
 
proportional to the value LO observed at the low contextual level, (ii) a
subtractive normalization factor
s2LO
s^2
LCjHO
þs2LO
s2HC
s2HCþs
2
HO
HO
 
proportional to the value HO
observed at the high contextual level, (iii) a divisive normalization factor
s^2
LCjHO;LO
s^2
LCjHO;LO
þs2R
 
that
captures the weighting dependent on the (relative) reward uncertainty. If we define the three
factors as τLO and τHO and K respectively, we obtain Eq 17.
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